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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--

-

----- - -- ---

-

-

- -

-

EZRA L. BELNAP and
LINA M. BELNAP,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 15168

ROBERT J. BLAIN and JUDITH ANN BLAIN
and AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, Ezra L. Belnap and Lina M. Belnap, appeal
from the granting of the defendants' motions for summary judgment
in a case wherein the plaintiffs claim a lien on certain real
property, pursuant to a judgment docketed against a third party,
Michael E. Crowley, who conveyed the subject matter real estate
to the defendants, Robert J. Blain and Judith Ann Blain.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants filed motions
for summary judgment which were heard on October 12, 1976.

Both

motions were denied.
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On December 16, 1976, plaintiffs again filed a motion
for summary judgment.

This motion was denied without prejudice

On March 23, 1977, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on a legal theory entirely different from their
previous motion.

This motion was granted by The Honorable Dean E

Conder and judgment was entered April 18, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents pray this Court affirm the judgment of the
trial court and award Respondents costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents controvert the Statement of Facts set forth
by the Appellants in their Brief.

The Statement of Facts set

forth therein is generally inaccurate and irrelevant.

For example

Appellants state that:
"Michael E. Crowley was vested in fee simple in 'All of
Lot 339, BRIGHTON HILLS NO. 3, according to the official plat
thereof', situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, R 50."
The Preliminary Title Report which was filed with the lower court
is hearsay and there never has been a finding that Crowley was so
vested in that real property.

The failure of the Appellants to

prove that fact was one of the reasons for the denial of their
motion for summary judgment.

Whether Crowley was vested in fee

simple of the real estate is immaterial because of the theory

upori

which the Respondents' motion for summary judgment was granted.
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.e,

Nor was there a finding that the mortgage of the
defendant, American Savings and Loan Association, was junior to
the Appellants' alleged judgment lien.

Again, the Preliminary

Title Report is not a finding of the lower court.

Such a fact

is also irrelevant.
The relevant facts are as follows:
1.

Appellants, and others, obtained a judgment

against Michael E. Crowley and Micro Development Corporation on
March 23, 1976.

(R. 6.)
2.

Apparently, the judgment was docketed March

3.

That on or about July 23, 1976, Michael E .

24, 1976.

Crowley sold his interest, if any, in real property located at
7607 Solitude Drive in Sandy, Utah, to Robert J. Blain and
Judith Ann Blain.
4.

(R. 74- 77.)
That on March 24, 1976, the property was

encumbered by mortgages and judgment liens in the amount of
$69,143.49.

(R. 80-83; and judicial notice of the following case

files in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah:
5.

225572, 217952.)

That on March 24, 1976, the fair market value

of the above described property was $64,180.00.
6.

(R. 78.)

That the judgment liens reflected in Case
-3-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Numbers 225572 and 217952, as more fully identified above, were
not satisfied prior to the conveyance from Michael E. Crowley
to the defendants, Robert J. Blain and Judith Ann Blain.

(Judicia:

notice of those case files.)
7.

That the balance due on the encumbrances

existing against the property, not including the alleged lien
of the Appellants, at the time of the closing of the sale from
Michael E. Crowley to the defendants, Robert J. Blain and Judith
Ann Blain, was $66, 006. 66, plus interest, represented as follows

8.

a.

First Federal Savings and Loan
Association - $32,704.53.
(R. 75.)

b.

Murray First Thrift - $21,465.31.
(R. 75.)

c.

David W. Sydow - $5,748.86.

d.

Aetna Finance Company - $1,385.02,
plus interest. (Judicial notice
as above.)

e.

Walker Bank and Trust Company $1,077.26, plus interest.
(Judicial notice as above.)

f.

Walker Bank and Trust Company $3,625.68, plus interest.
(Judicial notice as above.)

(R. 75.)

That the fair market value of the property at

the time of the sale from Michael E. Crowley to the defendants,
Robert J. Blain and Judith Ann Blain, was $64, 500. 00.
9.

(R. 78.)

That Michael E. Crowley received no money from
-4-
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the closing of the sale to the defendants, Robert J. Blain and
Judith Ann Blain.

(R. 75.)

From the above facts, the trial court determined that
at no time during the time that record title to the real estate
was in the name of Michael E. Crowley, assuming that it was, did
he ever have any equitable interest in the real estate to which
the lien could attach and, therefore, the lien did not attach;
or, at least, it did not become operative or effective.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANTS IS IMPROPER
The relief sought by the Appellants is improper in that
it asks the Supreme Court to direct the lower court, after remand,
to enter judgment of foreclosure.

Since that would deprive the

Respondents of a trial on the matter, it is improper, and,
therefore, beyond the jurisdication of this Court.

Therefore,

the appeal should be dismissed.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF POINTS ARE ALL INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS
The Statement of Points set forth on Page 3 of
Appellants' Brief are all insufficient to justify a reversal of
the swmnary judgment heretofore entered in favor of the Respondents.
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The first point is that the granting of the summary
judgment in favor of the Respondents with prejudice is improper
procedure.

There is nothing improper about granting a motion

for summary judgment where the affidavits show that there is no
dispute as to any material fact and that in the opinion of the
trial court, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

None of the affidavits were controverted and together,

the affidavits stated all facts necessary to support sunrrnary
judgment on the theory submitted.
The second point relied upon is that the granting of
Respondents' motions for sunrrnary judgment violates due process
of law.

Such is a constitutional argument and not only is without

merit, but was not raised in the lower court.

Even constitutional

arguments must be raised in the lower court before they can be
heard on appeal.

Alpha Corporation vs. Multnomah County, 189 P2d

988 (Ore. 1948).
Finally, the Appellants claim, in their Statement of
Points, that the granting of the Respondents' motions for summary
judgment does violence to the Utah Code, §78-22-1, and the law
and cases as declared by the Utah Supreme Court.
The trial court correctly interpreted the Judgment Lien
Statute.

That Statute says that a judgment, upon being docketed,

becomes a lien upon all the real property owned by the judgment
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debtor.

It hardly does violence to that Statute to interpret

it to mean that ownership requires some equitable interest.
In fact, it is apparent that that Statute was enacted with the
intention of requiring judgment creditors to satisfy judgments
from property of the judgment debtor only when he has some
equitable interest.

To allow a judgment creditor to satisfy

his judgment from property belonging solely to parties other
than the judgment debtor would be a windfall to the judgment
creditor, a miscarriage of justice upon the party ultimately
required to pay the judgment, since he did not incur the debt,
and a violation of the due process provisions of State and
Federal Constitutions which were designed to prevent the taking
of property without just compensation and due process of law.
Other jurisdications with similar Lien of Judgment
Statutes have been confronted with this problem.
In an Oklahoma case, the Judgment Lien Statute in
effect at the time of the judgment provided that judgments of
Courts of Record shall be liens upon the real estate of the
debtor within the county in which the judgment is rendered from
and after the time the judgment is entered on the judgment docket.
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company vs. Walton Trust Company,

136 p 769 (1913).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma interpreted that Statute
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as follows:
"It goes without saying that the real estate of one
party cannot be made subject to a judgment in favor of a stranger
and that only the property of a judgment debtor can be subjected'
to its satisfaction, as it would be unconscionable and violative
of the first rule of property to hold that that which belongs to
one may be taken on execution or made liable to the satisfaction
of the debt of another."
The Court went on to say:
"The lien of a judgment does not attach to the mere
legal title to the land existing in the judgment debtor, when
the equitable and beneficial title is in another ... A judgment
is a lien only on the interest of the debtor, whatever that may
be; therefore, though he seems to have an interest, if he had none
in fact, no lien can attach. Freeman on Judgments, § §357, 357a."
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company vs. Walton Trust Company,
supra, at 771.
In referring to what the Court called a very thoroughly
considered opinion by Judge Brewer in Holden vs. Garrett, 23 Kan
99, in interpreting a similar Statute, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma went on to say:
"This evidently contemplates actual and not apparent
ownership. The judgment is a lien upon that which is his, and
not that which simply appears to be his ... To extend the lien to
that which is not, but which appears of record to be, the
defendant's, is to do violence to the language. Real estate of
the debtor plainly means that which is, in fact, of or belonging
to the debtor." Holden vs. Garrett, supra, at 771.
In the case of Mauricau vs. Haugen, 56 NE2d 367 (1944),
the Supreme Court of Illinois was similarly confronted with the
interpretation of a Judgment Lien Statute which, like the Utah
Statute, merely provided that the judgment lien shall be a lien
-8-
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on the real estate of the person against whom obtained.

The

court interpreted that Statute as follows:
"The interest of the judgment debtor to which the
lien attaches, and which may be sold on execution is the actual
. t h e property. " Mauricau vs. Haugen,
'
interest h e h as in
supra,
at 374.
Judgment liens created by virtue of the Lien of
Judgment Statute in Utah should logically be limited to the
actual interest of the judgment debtor.

This interpretation is

supported by other jurisdictions.
Appellants' Brief is directed primarily to issues
which are not before this Court, such as whether the Appellants
can foreclose the alleged lien or whether satisfaction must come
through an execution sale; whether the property is exempt from
execution; whether the judgment or the docketing creates the
lien; the duration of the alleged lien; whether the interest of
the defendants in the property is subordinate to the claim of the
Appellants; and the effect of the assignment of Trust Deeds.
Appeals are limited to the order being appealed from and matters
collateral thereto are not before the Supreme Court.
vs. Coltharp, 248 P 481 (Utah 1926).

Carlquist

In this case, the order

being appealed from is the granting of the Respondents' motions for
summary judgment.

The motion was granted on the limited theory

that at no time while the judgment was effective did the judgment
debtor, Michael E. Crowley, have any equity in the property, and,

-9-
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therefore, the lien either never attached or if it did attach,
it never became effective or enforceable because the judgment
debtor had no equity.
A judgment is a lien only against that property in
which the judgment debtor has a beneficial interest.

Hunter vs.

State Bank, 61 So 497 (1913); Davis vs. Corrnnonwealth Trust
7 A2d 3 (1939).

Comp~,

A judgment lien is a lien only on the actual

interest of the judgment debtor, whatever that happens to be,

and

does not attach to the mere naked legal title when the equitable
estate is in another.

Guaranty State Bank of Okmulgee vs. Pratt,

180 P 376 (1919); Farmers State Bank of Ada vs. Keene, 167 P 207
(1917); US vs. Certain Lands in Borough of Brooklyn, 44 FSupp 830
(1942); Berry vs. Chadwick, 137 SW2d 859 (1940); Garrison vs.
Citizens National Bank of Hillsboro, 25 SW2d 231 (1930); Bolling vs.
Garrett, 31 P 135 (1892).
It has been held that a judgment creditor gets no
better rights than the judgment debtor.

Sparrow vs. Wilcox,

112 NE 296 (1916).
The judgment lien is general and only extends to that
which the debtor has, subject to the equities at date of judgment.
Mauricau vs. Haugen, supra, citing St. Louis Lumbar vs. Schnipper,
141 NE 542 (1923).
The interest which the lien of judgment affects is
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the actual interest which the debtor has in the property and
a Court of equity will always permit the real owner to show that
the apparent ownership of another is or was not real and when
the judgment debtor has no other interest except the naked legal
title, the lien of judgment does not attach.

McGee vs. Allen,

60 P2d 1026 (1936); Farmers State Bank of Ada vs. Keene, supra;
Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) §§420,421; Freeman on Judgments
(4th Ed.), §357.
Since the judgment debtor, Michael E. Crowley, never
had any actual or beneficial interest, from the date of the
docketing of the judgment against him, and since the equitable
estate has always been entirely in third persons, including the
defendants, the plaintiffs should have no better rights in the
property than the judgment debtor had.

The plaintiffs should be

subject to all the equities and the real owners of the property,
the defendants, should be permitted to show that the apparent
ownership in the name of Michael E. Crowley was not real and that
there was nothing to which the judgment could attach.
In the case of Morsell vs. Bank, 91 US 357 (1876),
the Supreme Court of the United States held that under the law
of Maryland, judgments at law were not liens upon the interest
of judgment debtors who had previously conveyed lands to a
Trustee in trust for the payment of a debt secured thereby.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of Iknoian vs. Winter, 270 P 999 (1928),
the defendant owned real property, subject to a mortgage.

The

defendant sold the property on contract and upon receiving
sufficient contract payments to satisfy his equity, he notified
the contract buyer that subsequent payments should be made to
the mortgagee.

No deed was executed to the contract buyer from I

the contract seller.

A judgment was docketed against the contrac:I

seller and the judgment creditor attempted to satisfy the
judgment from this real property which was in the name of the
judgment debtor, even though he had no equitable interest.

The

buyer successfully brought suit to quiet title against the claims I
of the judgment creditor.

In its opinion, the District Court of

Appeals, First District, Division I of California, held:
"It is true that under our codes any interest, legal
or equitable, which a defendant has in lands is subject to
attachment. Under this rule, the interest of a mortgagor in
I
lands contracted to be sold is bound by the lien of a judgment
recovered against him while the contract is unexecuted, to the \
extent to which it is unexecuted. Godfrey vs. Monrose, 35 P 761.
But, there must be an interest to which the lien can attach.
The law is well settled that the lien of a judgment does not
attach to a naked title, but only to the judgment debtor's
interest in the real estate; and if he has no interest though
possessing the naked title, then no lien attaches. Riverdale Min.I
Company vs. Wick, 112 P 896. Thus, a creditor who attaches
property for his debts obtains a lien only upon the title or
interest which the debtor has in the property at the time of the
levy and if at that time all title and interest has passed from
him to a third person, the creditor gets nothing by the levy.
Nat. Bank of Pacific vs. W. P. R. Company, 108 P 676."
1

Thus, the purchasers of the real property were awarded the propert
1
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free and clear of all judgment liens.

In the case before this

Court, the purchasers, Robert J. Blain and Judith Ann Blain,
should also be awarded the property free and clear of the lien
claimed by the plaintiffs for the same reason, namely, that the
judgment debtor had no equity in the real property even though
he held bare legal title.
In a Kansas case, a mortgagor found himself in a
position similar to that of Michael E. Crowley, in that he had
more mortgage indebtedness on the property than the property
was worth.

The mortgagor, therefore, decided to convey his

interest, which was bare legal title, to the mortgagee.

The

creditor who obtained a judgment before the conveyance claimed
a lien on the property that remained through the conveyance.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held as follows:
"If a mortgage is the eldest lien and is for an amount
equal to or exceeding the value of the mortgaged premises, and
the mortgagee, to avoid the expense of foreclosure, takes a
conveyance from the mortgagor, a Court of equity will not permit
the mortgaged premises to be swept away from him by a junior
judgment creditor, without payment of the mortgage, under the
pretense that its lien has been lost by merger, but will enjoin
the sale at law or restrict the judgment creditor's lien to the
equity of the redemption." Bolling vs. Garrett, supra, at 138.
The fact that in the case before the Court the
mortgagor, Michael E. Crowley, conveyed the real property to a
party other than the mortgagees, should be a distinction without

'i

a difference as far as the issue of whether the junior judgment

I
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lien can now sweep away the property from the party to whom it
was conveyed without first paying off the mortgage indebtedness.
If the plaintiffs had to first pay off the encumbrances
existing prior to the conveyance, they would find that there is
nothing left from the sale from which they could satisfy their
judgment.
Although there is authority that a judgment lien surviv
a conveyance by the judgment debtor, there still must be some
point in time, prior to the conveyance from the judgment debtor,
when he has some equitable interest in the property before the
lien can survive a conveyance by the judgment debtor.

At the

time of such conveyance, it must be determined whether he ever
had any equity from the time of the judgment lien until the
ance.

conv~

See Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in Gray vs. Stev'

302 Pd 273 (Utah 1956).

If he did not, then the lien should not

survive the conveyance and the parties should be entitled to a
judicial determination of the effect of the alleged lien so that
they may know the status of the property.
Admittedly, the judgment debtor, Michael E. Crowley,
could not have brought suit to quiet title to the property on the
theory that he had no equity after the judgment was docketed
against him.

This is evident because the judgment is good for

eight (8) years and should he acquire some equity in the property
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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then it must have an opportunity to attach or become effective.
But, once there has been a sale of the property, then there
should be a judicial determination of the effect of the alleged
lien.

This is because the sale would foreclose the possibility

of the judgment debtor acquiring some equity in the property for
some of the reasons set forth in the concurring opinion referred
to above.

Furthermore, the fear that the Supreme Court had in

that case, that the Court-found value of the property might not
be accurate, would be removed.

This is because here there is

not only a judicial determination of value, but value was determined by a sale on the open market with a competent appraisal
made at that time.
A judgment creditor is in a very different position
from one who has bought and paid, or who has loaned money on
the face of the recorded title, and he is not a bona fide
purchaser, for the reason that he has parted with nothing to
acquire his lien and for that reason, equity does not regard the
judgment creditor, but assists those who have invested in and,
therefore, have a substantial interest in the real estate.
Jackson vs. Thompson, 200 SE 16 (1938); J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Company vs. Walton Trust Company, supra.
In the case before this Court, plaintiffs are seeking
equitable assistance.

This Court should assist the defendants
-15-
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for they are the only parties who have invested in, and,
therefore, have a substantial interest in the real estate.
Many cases have held that the judgment creditor is
precluded from satisfying the lien from real property which is
not equitably owned by the judgment debtor, although legal title
is in his name, unless the
lending money.

Little vs.
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National Bank vs. Savarese, 134 So 501 (1931); Arundel Debenture
Corporation vs. LeBlond, 190 So 765 (1959); Laganke vs. Sutter,
187 So 586 (1939).
Plaintiffs never relied upon this real property when
they loaned Michael E. Crowley the money that resulted in a
judgment against him.

They could not have done so in good faith

because of the encumbrances of record upon the property, even
if they had known of it.

To allow plaintiffs to satisfy their

judgment against Michael E. Crowley from property belonging to
other parties would be a windfall to them and an injustice upon
the defendants who have a substantial investment in the real
property.
It would be extremely unjust to have a judgment
satisfied from property that, in reality, was never owned by the
judgment debtor at any time subsequent to the docketing of the
judgment.

At no time subsequent to said docketing did Michael E.

1
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Crowley have any equitable ownership interest or other ownership
interest in the real property sought to be foreclosed, other
than bare legal title.

The encumbrances exceeded the fair market

value during this entire period of time.
To allow the plaintiffs to satisfy their judgment from
property belonging to someone other than the judgment debtor
would be a windfall to them and a miscarriage of justice upon the
party ultimatley required to pay for a debt which was solely
that of the judgment debtor.

Plaintiffs did not rely upon this

real property in making their determination to lend money to
Crowley.

They could not have done so in good faith because of

the encumbrances of record, even if they had known that title
was in the name of the judgment debtor.

Therefore, plaintiffs

are no worse off if they are unable to satisfy their judgment from
this real property.

The affirmation of the judgment of the trial

court would preserve the status quo and preserve for them their
opportunity to satisfy the judgment from property belonging to the
party who ought to pay the judgment, namely, the judgment debtor,
and not the defendants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Davi B. Boyce
500 American Savings Build" g
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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